Consultanta Politica

by Vladimir Socor

On November 30 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev submitted a “Draft Treaty on European Security” for general consideration. The document is addressed to the heads of state and government of “all states of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok,” as well as to selected international organizations: NATO, the European Union, OSCE, CIS, and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Under the draft treaty’s article 10, all the addressee states and organizations are eligible to sign the proposed security treaty (full text on Russia’s presidential website, www.kremlin.ru, November 30).

In an accompanying message, Medvedev in effect proposes the opening of negotiations on the Russian draft. Russia’s foreign ministry wanted an immediate start to discussions, using the December 4 session of the NATO-Russia Council as a kick-off (Interfax, December 1). NATO, however, would relegate any discussions to the OSCE.

The Kremlin had intensified the drafting of such a treaty in the wake of its August 2008 invasion of Georgia. Consistent with past Soviet logic, it argued that an invasion that it had itself undertaken necessitated corrections to the existing security arrangements in line with Moscow’s views. Russia presented a general outline of its “security architecture” concept in Medvedev’s June 5 speech, presaging the submission of an actual draft treaty. The Kremlin timed the draft’s submission to the OSCE’s year-end ministerial conference and the reconvened NATO-Russia Council at ministerial level.

The draft treaty’s title, which speaks of “European security,” stands in some discrepancy with the content and the roster of eligible participants, which correspond with the “Vancouver to Vladivostok” political slogan. The document uses the concept of “treaty participant” to cover states as well as international organizations that would accede to the would-be treaty.

The preamble announces Russia’s goal to “create an interaction mechanism for resolving issues and differences as they arise.” The document makes clear that the proposed mechanism is intended to disorganize, sideline, and potentially override NATO.

Under article 1, “security measures undertaken by any participant, whether individually or in the framework of an alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with account taken of all the participants’ security interests in conformity with this treaty.” Such limitations would give Russia the possibility to claim a droit de regard over any NATO decisions.

Article 2 stipulates, “Treaty participants shall not undertake actions or steps that substantially affect the security of other treaty participants.” Participants that are members of alliances and coalitions shall “strive to ensure that decisions by those alliances and coalitions would not substantially affect the security of other treaty participants.” Furthermore, “no treaty participant shall allow the use of its own territory, and shall not itself use another participant’s territory … for any actions that substantially affect the security of other treaty participant.”

This proposal appears designed to encourage divisive debates within NATO over measures that Moscow and, potentially, Russia-First circles deem insufficiently accommodating of Russian interests, particularly in Europe’s East and the South Caucasus.

The multiple use of the word “substantial” seems intended to draw NATO into negotiations with Russia about defining that term, not only in this context, but also in another one of even greater topical significance. Under the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO declares that it does not intend to station “substantial” military forces on the territories of new member countries. Meanwhile, the Kremlin wants a joint NATO-Russia definition of that term, so as to restrict any hypothetical NATO deployments in Central European countries and the Baltic States (all of which are practically denuded of a NATO presence now). Negotiating with Russia about the admissible level of a hypothetical NATO presence would turn those countries into second-class members. NATO has avoided getting into such a situation thus far. If, however, negotiations begin to define “substantial” for the purposes of article 2 in Medvedev’s draft, NATO would then hardly be able to avoid the trap of discussing with Russia about what the Alliance may or may not do on the territories of post-1999 member countries.

Under article 3, “A treaty participant … may address other participants with requests to provide information about … any substantial steps of a legal, administrative, or organizational nature that, in the inquiring participant’s view, affect its security interests.” This stipulation looks like a less-than-poor substitute for the transparency and confidence-building measures enshrined in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Since 2008, Russia has largely suspended its compliance with the CFE Treaty (force ceilings, inspections, pre-notification of military movements) and wants a wholesale re-negotiation of the document. Article 3 of Medvedev’s draft treaty awkwardly attempts to deflect concerns and attention away from that problem.

Article 4 of Medvedev’s draft treaty would create mechanisms to “examine differences and disputes that may arise over this treaty’s interpretation and implementation.” The proposed mechanisms would operate on three levels: first, consultations in variable formats among treaty participants (states and international security organizations such as NATO, EU, OSCE, CSTO); second, the fully-fledged conference of treaty participants; and, third, their extraordinary conference.

This multi-format concept is designed to counterbalance, supplant, and splinter NATO’s own formats, including the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), with regard to debates and decision-making on topical security issues in the NATO area and its immediate eastern neighborhood.

Any treaty participant could “initiate Consultations with one or more participants, if the initiating participant deems that a violation or threat of violation of this treaty’s provisions has occurred or is imminent, or if it considers necessary to raise any issue related to this treaty’s contents.” In that case, the initiating participant may “address any treaty participant(s), whom it deems interested in examining that issue, with proposals to hold Consultations” (article 5).

Furthermore, any participant in consultations may subsequently propose holding a fully-fledged Conference [presumably, if the consultations turn out to be inconclusive]. The Conference shall be deemed legally constituted if at least two thirds of all treaty participants attend this forum. It shall operate under its own rules of procedure; and its decisions shall be “taken by consensus, and binding” (article 6).

A treaty participant that has been the object of an armed attack or is threatened with such an attack can call for an “Extraordinary Conference, to be held immediately for determining the necessary collective measures.” The Extraordinary Conference shall also operate under its own rules of procedure. This forum shall be deemed legally constituted if at least four or five treaty participants [the number seems negotiable in the draft] attend. The extraordinary conference’s decisions shall be “taken by unanimity, and binding” (article 8).

Thus, articles 5, 6, and 8 of the draft treaty would wreak havoc on NATO’s own decision-making processes and its procedures. Medvedev would group allied countries with Russia and its loyalists in some ad-hoc, unpredictable, arbitrarily created forums. This would result in parallel structures and potentially conflicting decisions. These articles are a prescription for chaos in NATO and instability in the NATO area and neighborhood.

By seeking to promote such fragmentation, Medvedev’s draft unwittingly exposes the real meaning of Russia’s concept of “indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security.” That concept is intended to justify Russia’s intrusion into NATO’s decision-making processes while at the same time maintaining a Russian-led Eurasian bloc and potential sphere of influence.

Moreover, article 8 seems custom-made for Russia to initiate or threaten military action under a CSTO flag of convenience. This is why Medvedev wants to empower an “Extraordinary Conference” of even “four or five” countries to authorize collective defense measures against an attack or threat of attack on a member country. This could put a collective guise on a Russian military intervention. Moscow would be delighted to receive a stamp of approval for CSTO-flagged actions from a NATO-approved forum, in the unlikely event that NATO accepts Medvedev’s proposal.

Under Medvedev’s article 7, “A treaty participant is entitled to regard an armed attack on another participant as an attack on itself;” and “it has the right to provide the necessary assistance, including military, before such time as the United Nations Security Council takes the necessary measures.”

The implications are at least threefold here. First, this procedure can justify a purely unilateral Russian military intervention, outside the CSTO’s nominal umbrella. Secondly, such intervention could pre-empt a decision by the “extraordinary conference” envisaged in article 8. Thus, Moscow claims a right to having its cake and eating it too, in terms of military intervention. And, thirdly, Moscow would breezily bypass the UN Security Council, even as it wants to hold the United States and others accountable to that same body.

Under the draft treaty’s article 9, “Treaty participants confirm that their obligations, stemming from other international security agreements, do not contradict the present treaty. The treaty participants shall not undertake international obligations incompatible with the present treaty.”

This formulation reverses entirely the standard clause whereby signatories to a new treaty declare that it does not prejudice their pre-existing commitments. Instead, Russia would stipulate that previous obligations should not contradict the new treaty. Thus, the Medvedev-proposed treaty would supersede NATO commitments (presumably including even Article Five) in Moscow’s interpretation. And it would also preclude future decisions that Moscow would deem “incompatible” with Medvedev’s treaty.

Medvedev’s draft treaty focuses overwhelmingly on issues of process and procedure, rather than substance. As such, it seeks to disorganize and fragment the NATO alliance, insert Moscow into NATO’s decision-making arrangements, and build a Russian sphere of predominant influence at the same time. All this could be seen as carrying NATO’s passive consent, if Medvedev’s document gains acceptance even as a basis for further discussions between Russia and NATO. For its part, the Alliance has refused to include Medvedev’s proposals on the NATO-Russia Council’s agenda, deflecting the discussions into OSCE formats.

–Vladimir Socor